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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VERONA WALLACE, 
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vs. 
COTTONWOOD MALL SHOPPING 
CENTER, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 240653 
This is an action by the plaintiff for injuries she 
sustained when she slipped on a foreign substance on the floor of 
the Cottonwood Mall. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried to a jury. On March 23, 1978 
the jury returned a special verdict finding (1) the defendant 
Cottonwood Mall 10% (Ten per-cent) negligent, (2) the plaintiff 
Verona Wallace 10%(Ten-Per-cent) negligent , and (3) other parties, 
80% (eighty per-cent) negligent. Based on the jury verdict the 
trial judge entered a judgement, no cause of action, in favor of 
the defendant. (R. 125-127). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Cottonwood Mall seeks affirmance of the 
judgement entered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 9, 1976 the plaintiff, an employee of one 
of the tenants of the Cottonwood Mall, in Salt Lake City, Utah , was 
walking through the cmmnon area of the Mall while on her lunch hour. 
As she walked in a southerly direction in the Mall proper, she 
slipped on a foreign substance and fell to the floor injuring her 
arm. The substance was later identified as spilled Orange julius 
drink. A customer at a nearby food counter testified that he saw 
a young man, presumably another customer, attempt to clean the 
spill (but that he did not get it entirely cleaned up) and that 
approximately two and one-half minutes later he saw the plaintiff 
slip on the spilled drink and fall to the floor. 
The court submitted the case to the jury on a special 
verdict. In a split decision the jury found the defendant Cotton-
wood Mall negligent and attributed 10% (ten per-cent) of the negli-
gence to it. The jury unanimously found the plaintiff negligent 
and attributed lcrk (ten per-cent) of the negligence to her. 
The jury found "other parties" , presumably the young man 
who apparently spilled the drink and attempted to clean it up, 80% 
(eighty per-cent) negligent. The trial judge entered a judgement of 
no cause of action in favor of the defendant Cottonwood Mall. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 IS NOT CONFUSING. 
Plaintiff-Appellant claims that Instruction No. 30 
is confusing. The portion of the instruction complained of 
reads as follows: 
"In answering the parts of the damage question, 
be careful not to include or duplicate in any 
part amounts included in any other part answered 
by you." 
This instruction is a simple an4 clear direction by 
the court to the jury cautioning them not to duplicate items of 
damage. There is no evidence that the jury was confused by this 
instruction. It cannot be said that their award did not conform 
to a reasonable view of the evidence on damages. Indeed if they 
were confused and in fact did duplicate items of damage this would 
only serve to increase the award to plaintiff and then defendant 
not plaintiff would be heard to complain. 
More importantly, however, the judge entered a judgement 
no cause of action in favor of defendant and plaintiff therefore is 
entitled to no damages and her quarrel with this damage instruction 
is not relevant. 
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POINT II 
THE JURY FOUND THE PLAINTIFF EQUALLY AS NEGLIGENT 
AS THE DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff, in her point II argument states that the jury 
found defendant Cottonwood Mall negligent and that its negligence 
was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. This is simply 
a statement of the jury's findings and the defendant admits that 
the jury so found. Defendant only points out, however, that the 
jury found plaintiff equally as negligent as defendant and that 
her negligence was a proximate eause of her own injuries, and 
accordingly her negligence, under Utah Code Anotated § 78-27-37 
(1953 amended) precludes the plaintiff from recovering. 
POINT III 
THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT INCONSISTENT IN ANY ~.ANNER 
AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT THE JURY WAS 
CONFUSED BY THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
Plaintiff's discussion of the courts instructions 
numbers 9,10,11 and 12 in part III of her argument, does not appear 
to be an objection to those instructions. These instructions set 
out the defendants' duty to the plaintiff and plaintiff apparently 
has no quarrel with them. Plaintiff does however complain of 
Instruction No. 16. First of all plaintiff is precluded from 
objecting to Instruction No. 16 since she did not object to that 
instruction at the trial of this matter. It is the law of this 
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state and almost every other jurisdiction that a party must make 
timely exceptions to instructions in order to raise that matter 
on appeal. In 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §1464 (6) it states: 
"Whether correct or erroneous, instructions which have 
not been properly challenged by objection, exception, 
assignment of error, or otherwise, must be accepted by 
the appellate court as the law of the case concerning 
the matters with which they purport to deal; they are 
not open to review and error therein is not ground for 
reversal." 
See also Rule 51 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Morgan 
vs. Pistone, 25 Utah 2d 63, 475, P.2d 839 (1970);Straka vs. Voiles, 
69 Utah 23, 252 P. 677 (1927). 
Furthermore Instruction 16 is a proper statement of 
the law. That instruction is as follows: 
"You will note that the person whose conduct we set up 
as a standard is not the extraordinarily cautious 
individual, nor the exceptionally skillful one, but a 
person of reasonable and ordinary prudence. While 
exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and 
encouraged, the law does not demand them as a general 
standard of conduct." 
Plaintiff states that this instruction was confusing to 
the jurors but does not tell us how or why it was confusing and 
there is absolutely no evidence to suggest that it was confusing. 
Plaintiff next complains of Instructions No. 20, 21 and 
22. 
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Instruction No. 20 states: 
"The Cottonwood Mall is under a duty to those persons 
using the Mall, to exercise reasonable and ordinary care 
to see that the premises are safe for the use so intended 
and that their condition will not expose a user of the 
Mall to an unreasonable risk of harm. In the exercise 
of its duty the Cottonwood Mall must use reasonable and 
ordinary care but under the law it is not an insurer of 
nor does it guarantee the safety of users of the 
premises." 
Instruction ·No.21 states: 
"You are instructed that the Cottonwood Mall is subject 
to liability for the harm caused to the plaintiff by a 
condition on the floor at the Cottonwood Mall if, but 
only if, you find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
1. The presence of the substance constituted a dange-
rous and unsafe condition, and 
2. That the defendant Cottonwood Mall by or through its 
agents had actual notice of the presence of the substance 
prior to the accident, and thereafter had a reasonable 
opportunity to remedy the condition and did not do so, 
or that if the defendant did not know of the presence of 
the substance causing plaintiff to fall that it had been 
on the floor so long that the defendant in exercising 
reasonable care should have known of its presence and 
thereafter had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the 
condition and did not do so." 
Instruction No. 22 states: 
"The defendant Cottonwood Mall may not be held liable 
for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, which resulte 
from a dangerous condition not caused by the acts of the 
Cottonwood Mall employees, and of which the Cottonwood 
Mall had no knowledge, unless that condition existed for 
such a length of time that if the defendant had exercised 
ordinary and reasonable care it would have discovered 
the condition and could have remedied it before the time 
of the injury." 
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Defendant submits that plaintiff has no cause to complain 
of these instructions since plaintiff herself requested similar 
instructions, which set out essentially the same rules of law as 
those stated in the courts instructions. Plaintiff's requested 
instructions No.3 and 4 read as follows: 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 3 states: 
"Even though defendant, acting through its servants and 
agents had no actual notice of the orange julius subs-
tance on the floor, if you find from the evidence that 
the slippery substance remained on the floor for a length 
of time that defendant in the exercise of reasonable care, 
could have discovered it, and remedied the condition, 
you must then find the issues in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant and assess damages accordingly." 
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 4 states: 
"You are further instructed that one who operates a 
mercentile establishment is not an insurer of the safety 
of those who enter his door." 
Moreover, the instructions of which plaintiff complains 
set out rules of law that are firmly established in the State of 
Utah. 
In Koer vs. Mayfair Markets , 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d. 
566 (1967), the plaintiff was injured when she slipped on a grape 
that had been allowed to remain on the floor of defendants store. 
At the lower court the judge set aside a jury verdict on her 
behalf and entered a judgement for the defendant notwithstanding 
the verdict. In affirming the trial court decision the Supreme 
Court stated: 
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"It cannot be disputed that a store owner is obligated 
to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises reasonably 
safe for the protection of those patron~ ing his store .... 
It is common knowledge that a store owner is not an 
insurer of the safety of his customers." ..... Therefore 
in order to find the defendant negligent it must be sho~ 
it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known, of any hazardous condition and had a reason-
able opportunity to remedy the same." id at 343. 
In Allen vs. Federated Dairy Farms Inc. 538 P.2d 175, 
(Utah 1975) the plaintiff sued for injuries sustained when he 
slipped on some cottage cheese on the floor of the defendant 
Albertson's store. The court granted defendants motion for 
SUIIllllary Judgement and plaintiff appealed. In affirming the trial 
court the Supreme Court stated: 
" It is appropriate to observe that these slip 
and fall cases have usually been regarded as £-al.ling 
in either one or the other of two different classes. 
The first involves some unsafe condition of a tempo-
rary nature such as a slippery substance on the floor 
and usually where it is not known how it got there. In 
this class of cases it is quite universally held that 
fault cannot be imputed to the defendant so that lia-
bility results therefrom unless two conditions are met: 
(A) that he had knowledge of the condition, that is, 
either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge be-
cause the condition had existed long enough that he 
should have discovered it; and (B) that after such know-
ledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise of 
reasonable care he should have remedied it." id at 176. 
See also Ohlson vs. Safeway Stores Inc., 568 P.2d 753 
(Utah 1977); Long vs. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 
1973); Howard vs. Auerbach Company, 20 Utah 2d 355, 437 P.2d, 
895 (1968); Lindsey vs. Eccles Hotel Company, 3 Utah 2d 355, 284 
P.2d 477 (1955). 
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Plaintiff next complains that Instruction No. 24 is 
confusing to the jury, but again simply makes the bald conclusion 
that it is confusing without stating how it is confusing. Defen-
dant submits that it is a proper statement of the law and that it 
is a clear and simple statement of the law that could not confuse 
the jury. 
Significantly all of those instructions, No. 20, 21, 
22 and 24 of which plaintiff complains set out the duty of defen-
dant in this case. Indeed the jury found the defendant-respondent 
had breached its duty and found it negligent. How then can 
plaintiff complain that these instruct~ons were improper and con-
fusing? If the jury was confused by them, then that confusion was 
resolved in plaintiffs favor by its finding that defendant was 
negligent. Plaintiff next complains of Instruction No. 25 which 
states: 
"It was the duty of the plaintiff Verona Wallace to use 
reasonable care under the circumstances in walking in 
the area in which she chose to walk to observe and be 
aware of the existing conditions then and there present 
and to keep a look out for obstacles or other conditions 
reasonably to be anticipated." 
Plaintiff argues that this instruction places plaintiff 
in the category of "licensee" rather than "invitee". In reality 
this instruction simply and properly places on plaintiff the burden 
of using ordinary care for her own safety. Even though plaintiff 
was a business invitee she nevertheless had a duty to use due care 
for her own safety. See Cooper vs. Evans, 1 Utah 2d 68, 262, P.2d 
278 (1953). In any event the distinction under the facts of this 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
case is meaningless. The licensee-invitee distinction has no 
bearing on a plaintiff's duty to use due care for her own safety, 
but rather has reference to the nature of the landowners duty 
to the user of the premises. 62 Am Jur 2d. Premises Liability 
§ 37 - 57. Defendant has already shown that the court properly 
instructed the jury under the law of the State of Utah with 
regard to defendants duty under the facts of this case. Again, 
defendant points out that plaintiff has no cause to complain 
about the courts instructions regarding defendants duty inasmuch 
as that issue was resolved by the jury in plaintiff's favor. 
POINT IV 
THE ANSWERS IN THE SPECIAL VERDICT WERE NOT IN-
CONSISTENT. 
Plaintiff asserts, that the answers on the special 
verdict were inconsistent and argues that the court had a duty 
to clarify this confusion. Plaintiff suggests that since the 
jury awarded damages, they intended that plaintiff should have 
received those amounts and that accordingly they must have been 
confused (presumably when they answered the questions relating to 
liability). Plaintiff fails to point out however that the judge 
instructed the jury to answer the question on the verdict form 
regarding damages regardless of how they answered the questions 
regarding liability. The first paragraph in the courts Instructi~ 
No. 30 reads as follows: 
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"You must answer the damage question no matter how you 
have answered any of the previous questions in the 
verdict. By asking you to determine the amount of 
damages, the court is not indicating, nor is it asking 
you to indicate that the party whose damages are being 
determined is entitled to them." 
Furthermore plaintiff cannot now complain that the 
judge failed to clarify or to reinstruct the jury since plaintiff 
did not make any such request of the trial judge. 
Plaintiff argues that the jury was not instructed that 
the instructions should be considered in their entirity and that 
specific instructions should be considered along with all others. 
Plaintiff is totally in error about this as that court did so 
instruct the jury in Instruction No. 39. 
Plaintiff also suggests that the court was in error 
by not submitting this case on a general verdict. The answer to 
that argument is that this case was decided under Comparative 
Negligence and the court was asked and therefore required to submit 
the case on a special verdict. Utah Code Anotated § 78-27-38 (1953 
as amended) . 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant-Respondent, Cottonwood Mall, submits that there 
is no evidence whatsoever that the jury was confused as regards any 
of the instructions given to them by the court, and further that all 
of the instructions complained of by the plaintiff were proper state-
ments of the law and that the judgement entered below should be 
affirmed. 
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Respectfully Submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
By ~ l-- c/1 ~ 
FRANK\ G . NOEL \ -
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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